



CONGRESS - 3

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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February 24, 1988

MEMORANDUM
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TO: NEA - Mr. Djerejian

THRU: NEA - Robert A. Peck

FROM: NEA/PAB - Robert A. Flaten

SUBJECT: Afghanistan: Briefing members of Congress

Attached talking points are for use by NEA and H in describing our position on the Afghan negotiations. They are essentially a condensation of the Peck testimony scheduled for February 25. H would talk from and leave behind copies of these points with friendly members.

Robert Peck will be meeting with Senate staffers this afternoon. In the meantime, I suggest you place calls to Lugar who has expressed an interest in being helpful. You might also touch base with Bradley who has been a close contact of Mike Armacost's, report to him briefly on Armacost's impressions from Moscow, tell Bradley that Mike is in Pakistan and will want to talk with him when he gets back from his present trip. Bradley will be able to give a good sense of what the Senate mood on Afghanistan is at present. You could also call Senator Moynihan who has co-sponsored the Proclamation Resolution for Afghanistan Day. You could express our appreciation for the fact that the Proclamation Resolution remains relatively clean, and, get his views on the Afghan situation. We will have a few more targets for you following this afternoon's meeting with Senate staff.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED by RIR

DATE 7/3/88

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AFGHANISTAN

-- After his Moscow meetings Secretary Shultz said he was convinced that the Soviet Union has decided that it wants to leave Afghanistan. Detailed provisions of the withdrawal remain to be worked out in the negotiations in Geneva which resume on March 2. We hope this can be the final round of the Geneva talks.

-- The Soviets want withdrawals to begin before the Summit meeting. This puts pressure on the Soviets to agree to acceptable withdrawal modalities promptly in the Geneva talks.

-- U.S. goals in Afghanistan are the earliest possible withdrawal of Soviet troops, return of the refugees in safety and honor, and an independent and non-aligned Afghanistan where Afghans could express their right of self-determination. The goals have been overwhelmingly endorsed by the world community in repeated UNGA resolutions, with a record 123 votes last November.

-- The Geneva agreements must lead to the fulfillment of these objectives in order to win US support.

-- One Geneva instrument calls on the Soviet Union and the United States to serve as guarantors of the agreements. We have agreed in principle, provided we are totally satisfied with the overall Geneva outcome which must include a short withdrawal timetable, immediate removal of a substantial number of Soviet troops, a commitment to front-loading of a major portion of the troops within three months or so, and provisions for monitoring the withdrawal.

-- As guarantors, the US and the USSR would agree not to intervene or interfere in Afghanistan; we would not guarantee the activity of other nations. We believe that outside interference including assistance to all factions in Afghanistan should cease at the time of the withdrawal. We are pressing for agreement on this point.

-- We agree with the Government of Pakistan that it would be highly desirable to have an agreed interim government in place to sign the Geneva agreements and take responsibility for implementing them. This would assure the safe return of the refugees and provide confidence to all that the agreements would be carried out in full. We are encouraging the Afghans in this direction, but this is an issue that is fundamentally up to the Afghans.

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-- The present regime in Kabul is not representative of the Afghan people, and even with the presence of 120,000 Soviet troops, it controls less than one fourth of Afghanistan. We do not believe that it can survive the withdrawal of its Soviet protectors.

-- We will not end our aid to the Afghan resistance until we are totally satisfied that the Geneva agreements will get the Soviets out, bring about a return of the refugees, and result in a free Afghanistan.

-- We may be on the threshold of an historic achievement. Our overriding goal of the early withdrawal of Soviet troops appears attainable. If it is, we will want to seize this opportunity.

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